Twenty years after German unification, rural East Germany still remains in deep economic crisis. The fact that the physical, social and private infrastructure have improved significantly, but with seemingly little effect on the economic performance and negative demographic trends, raises the question of alternative, institutional and social explanations for the current crisis. In this context this paper explores the concept of social capital and its relation to rural development in order to understand the current rural crisis in East Germany. It describes the process of agricultural restructuring after unification and analyses the processes of formation and destruction of different forms of social capital in this process.
Introduction
Twenty years after German unification, rural East Germany still remains in deep economic crisis. Despite huge financial transfers to modernise East German infrastructure and industries rural unemployment remains unimaginably high. European Enlargement to the East has exerted additional economic pressure on East Germany, particularly because of the apparently sheer abundance of cheap labour. The fact that the physical, social and private infrastructure have improved significantly, but with seemingly little effect on the economic performance and negative demographic trends, raises the question of alternative, institutional and social explanations for the current crisis. In this context this paper explores the concept of social capital.
In recent years social capital has been identified as a key element for successful rural development. Yet social capital is often discussed as if it could be handled like a physical entity, that has durable existence independent from the basic state institutions and that it can simply be used as an additional ingredient and precondition for externally initiated development plans and interventions. The message of this paper is that different forms of social capital exist that may grow or decline in relation to institutional changes and policy design. However, not all forms of social capital will endure during institutional change, but new forms have to be created. Thus, for such a kind of question East Germany, that has undergone fundamental institutional changes, provides the ideal base. This paper discusses three forms of social capital in rural areas that has either vanished or been maintained during the transition phase. It also argues that the given institutional framework does not offer suitable incentives for the formation of other forms of social capital that are necessary to overcome the rural crisis. Therefore, I first discuss the concept of social capital and its relation to rural development. Secondly, the legacy of the socialist rural regime and its transformation during the recent years are described. Thirdly, some basic patterns of rural change in East Germany are presented. Finally, the forms of social capital and the trajectory of their development are discussed.
Social Capital, Paternalism and Rural Development
By very broad definition social capital can, first, be understood as the capability of social groups to act collectively. Secondly, social capital is also described as an individual resource resulting from somebody's social position within a particular field of action. There is no agreed definition of social capital (see Woolcock 1998, Dasgupta and Serageldin 2002) . However, four common aspects of scientific discussions can nevertheless be identified (Pretty and Ward 2001) . Firstly, social capital is generally associated with trust. Trust reduces the costs of control. A lack of trust makes the realisation of co-operative solutions more difficult. Secondly, social capital is also associated with reciprocal exchange relations. Simultaneous exchange on the basis of roughly equal exchange is called specific reciprocity. More important in this regard is diffuse reciprocity. Diffuse reciprocity refers to exchange within lasting relationships which does not expect an immediate service in return for the service rendered, but is only connected with the expectation of a future service in return. Thirdly, common rules, norms and sanctions are another important element of social capital and place collective interests above individual interests to the extent that it is mutually recognised. By this means, individual action is constrained but at the same time made possible because individual rights can be safeguarded and do not have to be constantly affirmed. The fourth aspect comprises the nature, content and extent of social relations, the networks of the local actors themselves and their relations to other (external) actors and networks.
Network theory plays an important role for both definitions of social capital. It also relates social capital to the concept of power. Firstly, social capital as an individual source of power derives from one's social position within a network. Centrality of a social position is among the most common measures to describe positional power. However, the most central position within a network may not always be the most powerful position (Jansen 1999, p. 121) . A second, and for our analysis even more important result of network analysis, is that social capital also derives from those positions that link different networks. Such weak (social) ties (Granovetter 1973) , which bridge 'structural holes' (Burt 1992) , constitute social capital, too.
From a network theory perspective, individual social capital and collective social capital are not necessarily exclusive. The first argument in favour of this statement is that the network position can also be described for a group of actors or even networks themselves. Secondly, some forms of individual social capital have clearly been identified to strengthen collective social capital, too. For instance, the structural autonomy of actors, which derives from the ability to bridge structural holes at what is called 'cutpoints' (Burt 1992) , is an individual form of social capital. As social capital theorists argue, the density of social linkages between networks is a form of collective social capital, which is based on such actors and brings about trust and norms of reciprocity on which successful cooperation is based (Putnam 1993, p. 173) . In this sense, collective social capital goes along with the structural autonomy of many people.
Many of these issues addressed by social capital theorists have been put forth by rural sociologists under the label of 'endogenous' development (e.g. Long, 1994, van der Ploeg and van Dijk 1995) and in German speaking countries as 'autonomous' development (Pongratz and Kreil 1991) . The main idea of this debate was to draw on internal community resources for rural development rather than to rely on external support. This general idea has been subject to further elaboration in line with Woolcock's (1998) argument that social capital is not only the ability to draw on intra-community resources, but also related to the existence of linkages to extra-community networks. A similar idea was brought forward by Lowe et. al. (1995) . They say that there might be the case that peripheral regions may not be able to generate development from within. Therefore, they plead to go beyond endogenous growth models and recognise and indeed celebrate interconnections between areas and between networks (Lowe et al. 1995, p. 104) . They stress the issues of participation and power within the development process. Empirical findings appear to confirm this view (Terluin 2001 ). The crucial aspect of endogenous growth is that it draws on social capital as the ability to mobilise the potentials of an existing 'active society' that will generate entrepreneurs and self-help institutions from within. In the recent debate, more and more scientists have stressed the diversity of local potentials. Two practical issues are related to this: how is social capital built and how is it related to the institutional environment provided by the state and is it affected by state interventions? Putnam (1993) described social capital formation as a process lasting for centuries. In this sense, social capital is a cultural tradition and has to be treated as an exogenous variable (Paldam and Svensen 2000, p. 347) . It may be argued that the low rate of social capital formation is due to little rational consideration of its development effects. Currently, it appears to be an open question to what extent social capital formation can be influenced at all. It often comes about as a positive externality of activities aiming at another purpose. An optimistic view is to invest into institution building strategies and attempts to encourage co-operative movements within development policies. However, experience indicates great difficulties and slow progress (Paldam and Svensen 2000) .
One basic problem is seen in the role of external and particular state agencies to enforce participation. Many scientists argue that there is little or no opportunity for the state to contribute to social capital formation. Indeed, the basic idea of social capital refers to voluntary sector activities, and selfenforcement rather than third party enforcement. Attempts by third parties -as public authorities -to enforce social capital may thus be counterproductive (Paldam and Svendsen 2000, p. 366) . Warner (1999) questions this view. Her argument is that it depends on the local context, i.e. the local power structures, what effects will come from policy influences. Referring to Woolcook's (1998) concept of linkage, she argues that the structure of autonomy and linkages determines how communities respond to external influences. It is, in particular, in communities characterised by hierarchical social capital and weak or patronage government systems where outside support is required. In this context, devolution may be counterproductive. The idea of hierarchical social capital itself draws on the concept of paternalism (Schuman and Anderson 1999) . Paternalism describes a particular social setting that is rather common in rural places. I think that its basic characteristics are important for the understanding of rural East Germany (and probably other Central and Eastern European countries, too).
The basic characteristic of a local paternalistic system is the existence of a large firm in a relatively isolated geographical context 1 . Due to its domination of the local labour market, the firm is also dominating all other aspects of community life. The second feature of paternalism is an ethic of social responsibility among the dominating class. Due to this moral orientation, the elite tends to provide and support a wide range of social services and facilities, such as housing, health care and schooling. Generally, paternalism is seen as being connected with family ownership and the idea of the owner-managed firm. However, under western style capitalism many family firms have been transformed into companies with a diversified owner structure. Furthermore, there evolved quasi-paternalistic systems in nationalised industries (e.g. coal mining in Britain). Likewise, such systems developed under socialist conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, the state as a body and its representatives in persona are in the position of the dominating class of the owners.
In many cases, paternalism is understood as a reminiscence of early industrial times. It is argued that industrial paternalism has vanished because of bureaucratisation and the withdrawal of family owners from management. However, as argued above, forms of paternalism can also be identified without the existence of the family owner domination. Paternalism has also been identified in non-industrial sectors, such as agriculture. Hence, what appear to be more significant are social and economic changes, which undermine paternalism in western societies. On the one hand, the economic basis of paternalism, which is usually connected with the primary sector or traditional industries, has come under immense pressure because of forced global competition. On the other hand, geographical isolation has decreased in line with increasing mobility, and as a consequence geographically expanding labour markets.
In an ideal type situation, we would expect the transformation of paternalistic local structures to allow for more independent local policies, less influence of the dominating firm on local social life, and scope for new entrepreneurial activities. In a word, the ideal development is characterised by a stronger differentiation of private, public and voluntary sector institutions and the involvement of a wider range of local actors. However, in many cases the experience is rather different. Firstly, we find that the development of a small business sector, which is able to compensate for job losses and constitutes the base for an active society, is rather the exception than the rule. The arguments for that are manifold (e.g. Rees and Thomas 1991, Laschewski 2000) . Some stress explicitly the subjective barriers of workers to become entrepreneurs. There is no doubt that it means a considerable psychological effort to overcome the habits of a "Deferential Worker" (Newby 1978) , and develop entrepreneurial spirit. However, the structural barriers are also considerable. Many workers with similar knowledge and experience start to seek opportunities in an environment that does not have much to offer. Under such conditions, longdistance commuting or migration often offers a more realistic chance for many, while new entrepreneurs have often formerly been middle-level managers or specialists of the previous dominant firm. As a social consequence, we observe the evolution of new middle classes and also of a large social group of losers (e.g. Schuman and Anderson 1999) . Due to the weak development of the business sector, the old paternalistic firms' (or its successors') position remains, despite economic decline, rather dominant in the local labour market. Moreover, they still have control of important local resources, such as land, local housing estates etc. Nevertheless, those firms tend to withdraw from social activities. Therefore, voluntary activities face severe constraints due to lack of support.
In the following, it is argued that local rural structures in the former GDR can be understood as quasi-paternalistic structures. Therefore, the East German experience is largely comparable to the development in other rural areas where paternalistic local structures came under economic pressure.
Patterns of the Rural Crisis
Under socialism, a system of large-firm paternalism evolved, which were specific for rural areas in the GDR since the 1970s. This system was firstly based on a concentration and collectivisation of small businesses in large companies organised either as co-operatives or state firms (for these processes in agriculture see Laschewski 1998 ; for industry and service see Albach and Witt 1993) . Secondly, the labour market and the housing market were strictly regulated within the planned economy. Due to the artificial isolation based on regulation, the type of rural paternalism, which is described below, also existed in accessible locations. Finally, the socialist unity party occupied a monopolistic domination together with a caring ethic within socialistic ideology.
Rural employment was largely based on agriculture and industries. The latter were located in larger rural towns. Locally there may have been other large employers, such as the army or tourist resorts. However, for most villagers there were two main employment options: either being employed by the local agricultural (co-operative or state-owned) firm or commuting to the next town. In particular in the remoter rural areas, agricultural firms employed up to a third of the labour force (Rodewald and Siebert 1995) . However, only about 60 per cent of the jobs in such firms were agricultural jobs. Beyond those, there was a wide range of activities such as administrative and social services, building and construction, food processing, technical services and transportation (BMELF 1991, Großkopf and Kappelmann 1994) .
Agricultural firms provided a wide range of services for the community, ranging from infrastructure provision to cultural activities and social services (Parade 1998 , Zierold 1997 ). There has been little research on personal relationships among villagers and agricultural firms. The position of the chairman of the firm had, as already mentioned, been fairly strong. Otherwise chairmen were also mostly integrated into dense family networks within the community. Studies carried out after 1990 indicated that the 'old peasantry' continued playing a distinctive role within many communities (Brauer, Willisch, Ernst 1996 , Laschewski 1998 ). An important part of the population were refugees from the former Eastern parts of Germany, which had been settled in rural areas after the Second World War, and mostly started with great difficulty as 'new peasants' after the land reform of 1945.
There has been little research on the participatory practice within firms and villages. Formally, democracy particularly within agricultural co-operatives was very strong. However, at the firm level, there was no realistic chance to influence economic plans made by state authorities. Representation through unions was very weak and the labour regime comparatively rigid. Otherwise, the board of the cooperative consisted of about 15 to 20 people from among the staff. There was also a wide range of committees, which were at least formally open to everybody and not limited to employees of the co-operatives. Although the power of committees might have been rather confined, it guaranteed the involvement of many. The integrative role of agricultural firms and their undeniable social contributions may explain the high degree of identification by employees, which was expressed in 1990 (Hubatsch et. al. 1991) .
With other former socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, East Germany shares the experience of sudden market liberalisation. Contrary to those countries, East Germany did not create its own, new political institutions. West Germany provided an existing institutional framework, which simply had to be transferred. This could be considered as an 'ideal' situation, if transformation from a planned to a market economy is the political objective. Therefore, changes have been more fundamental in East Germany than in any other country, and in addition, it was more profoundly hit by the momentum of market liberalisation that came along with the economic and monetary union in summer 1990. While the adaptation to the West German policy system, and for some policy fields such as Agricultural Policy also to the European policy system needed some years to operate well, market liberalisation took effect right away. The highly subsidised agricultural producer and consumer prices quickly adapted to the West European level. West European agricultural producer prices were, by international comparison still high, yet still far lower than those of the GDR. In the first two years after unification this sharp price drop led to a dramatic reduction of agricultural production capacities. The worst could only be prevented by huge financial payments to maintain liquidity of agricultural firms, and social policy measures, in particular early retirement, to avoid mass unemployment. (For a detailed analysis of these processes and their consequences for rural areas see, among others Beckmann and Hagedorn 1997 , Forstner and Isermeyer 2001 , Laschewski et al. 2002 . The employment effects have been dramatic and are still at the core of the rural crisis.
During the GDR time, as a result of socialist collectivisation and subsequent concentration processes, the number of agricultural enterprises fell, according to official statistics, from about half a million after the Second World War to just 8,668 in 1989. At this point about 805,000 people were employed in agriculture. Since then, in the course of the restructuring resulting from German unification, the number of agricultural enterprises has increased to the present figure of about 27, 900 while the number of people employed in agriculture has fallen to about 166, 700 (BMVEL 2002) . The greater part of this dramatic loss of employment occurred in the first three years, which would have been impossible in this form without extensive social security measures.
After 1990 the farm sector was also subject to privatisation and restitution. However, collectivisation in the GDR did not formally mean the expropriation of former landowners, although practically those property rights were not effective. Because of that, ironically the landownership structures of the 50s were preserved under socialism. However, the reinstallation of those property rights was comparatively easy, although some problems occurred, since former boundaries had to be identified and solutions found for constructions, which under socialism were built on private land. About one third of agricultural land was subject to socialist land reform after 1945 and also partly in the early 50s, half of which was restituted, while about 1,4 million ha were privatised. Due to immense legal uncertainties, this process is still going on. Until 2005 only about a quarter had been privatised. Agricultural Policy tried to overcome the socialist farm structure with financial subsidies. Consequently, the number of farms increased continuously until 2001. However, the emerging structure is very specific (picture 2).
Characteristic elements of the current farm structure in East Germany are firstly, the continuation of a comparatively small number of very large agricultural enterprises which came into existence mainly as successor enterprises to agricultural production co-operatives (LPG). Usually they manage more than 800 ha. Secondly, there are a continuously increasing number of highly professionalized enterprises of varied legal status, which are large (200 to 500 ha) by international standards. Finally, we find numerous smaller, part-time family farms. More than 50% of the farms use less than 50 ha. The number of farms in this group rapidly increased until 1997 and is currently stagnating.
Another element is the almost complete separation of owners and farmers, which is reflected in the high proportion of tenancies among agricultural enterprises. The 'ownership problem' is the historical result of agricultural collectivisation and restitution policies after German unification. Agriculture in East Germany is first and foremost tenant farming. In addition, it is in great measure confronted with various forms of absentee ownership; that is to say it is faced with owners who are no longer locally resident and on occasion have not yet been identified. Despite the dramatic loss of employment, agriculture in East Germany, especially in remote rural areas, is still a significant economic activity, accounting for a comparatively high proportion of local employment. The total added value of the agricultural sector in East Germany is low in comparison with other German regions. The most common problem is lack of capital, which would allow to build up more animal production. At the same time the farm structures seem to enforce profit (from capital) maximisation rather than value added growth.
In such a situation non-agricultural development is vital for the rural economy. Much attention has been paid to new entrepreneurship. Several studies reveal that rural areas generally show poor business formation rates (e.g. Braun and Diensberg 2002, Laschewski and . Business formation is usually urban-based and located in cities and suburbs. A notable exemption here is tourism. Tourism is an important rural economic sector that utilises non-material land-use potential. In many rural areas it represents the growth sector, but it is generally still in the phase of development and can scarcely be regarded as consolidated. However, despite a drastic decline agriculture and food industries remain the backbone, in particular of those rural regions that show little attraction for tourism. In addition, we find that even the potential of tourist development has not as yet been fully explored.
Finally, people respond to these problems with emigration rather than initiative. There is a lack of innovation and actors that take risk. At the same time emigration, in particular youth emigration has caused political concern (BBR 2000) . Few job offers and insufficient training opportunities are core problems, which cause significant emigration among young people aged between 18 and 25. There is a danger of developing a 'culture of emigration' , which affects the development potentials of rural areas (Siebert 1999) . Currently the situation is getting even worse. The emigration patterns in conjunction with the general ageing of German society have already initiated a debate of infrastructure provision in remote rural areas.
Forms of Social Capital in Transition
Institutional changes and economic decline have gone along with changes in the forms of social capital. Some groups were able to draw successfully on their network relations, while others were not.
Exchange networks and community based activities
Community based networks in rural villages found their institutional backbone in the social service infrastructure provided by the agricultural co-operatives, and the consumer cooperatives that ran shops in almost every village. Due to the shortage of everything under socialism exchange networks also played a significant role. It was particularly useful to know somebody in a distributive position (in a shop or store) or to have West German relatives who might send rare goods that could be used to barter. Household agricultural production had been financially made attractive under socialism by a price reform in the early eighties. Thus, rural local life had also been structured around those production activities.
Regarding these rich networking traditions it has been surprising, how quickly such social networks vanished. Indeed, a lack of civic commitment and a decreasing interest in voluntary activities in rural communities have been identified as a political and developmental problem. On the one hand, local clubs that have survived, often suffer from lack of interest. A typical example is the voluntary fire brigade (Rodewald 1994) . There is little doubt that higher mobility and job uncertainty have affected local networks and civic commitment. Additionally, due to well-functioning consumer markets former exchange networks have lost their function, and agricultural household production has widely been abandoned because of price reductions. Finally, the decline of agricultural cooperatives has affected the provision of services in rural villages. This has led to a reduction in many services. In a community study Rodewald (1994) described the situation as follows: All social and cultural services (Health Station, Pub, Local Shop) have meanwhile been closed. Institutions such as child nursery, day home for schoolchildren and classrooms are abandoned. Community networks have literally lost their place. In many localities community buildings and other places for local gatherings such as shops or canteens in co-operatives have been closed while new facilities have rarely been established. Hence, instead of being able to draw on existing networks, communities have to find their own, self-reliant status as a functioning unit independent of agriculture (Herrenknecht 1995) .
However, according to Brauer (2001, p. 62) , it is not merely the general lack of local initiative, but the way how local actors are treated as subjects rather than actors in the planning and development system and live by chance in the planning area. Under such circumstances, approaches of "civic participation" are to inform and teach local people rather than encourage bottom-up initiatives. Parallels to political agitation and attempts to mobilise local actors for public activities of socialist times are obvious (ibid., Laschewski and Siebert 2001, p. 40) . Bruckmeier (2000) argues that LEADER II, a European participatory rural development initiative, has served in East Germany as a conventional rural development tool rather than a measure to integrate independent projects. The village renewal programme has been quite successful as a measure to improve the local infrastructure, but it has not been a successful tool in strengthening local participation. It appears that the sheer amount of development programmes (Brauer 2001 ) and the tendency to favour largescale projects (Beetz 2001, p. 83 ) are core problems, which seem to stabilise the involvement of the few rather than the participation of many.
Social Capital and Agricultural Restructuring
There is one group of actors, the managerial class of agricultural firms, which was generally able to maintain power due to its central professional position. As Küster (2002) has shown for the region of Thuringia in the southern parts of the former GDR in many cases they have not only managed to keep the former agricultural co-operatives in various legal structures together, but also the founders of highly professionalized agricultural firms largely came from this group. In an analysis of the local participation process in Brandenburg, the area surrounding Berlin, we found the socially central role of a few large agricultural enterprises (Laschewski 2006) . They are well organised to press their interests and participate in numerous activities at the interface between the state and the private sector. For this reason they seem to be the ideal type of actors for the idea of public-private partnership. The big agricultural enterprises, or their management representatives, are central actors in all the relevant associations, networks and initiatives. What is especially remarkable, is the continuing dominant role of the representatives of the big agricultural enterprises in the important local network structures despite the obvious decline in the economic importance of these enterprises. Their most important partner is frequently the state. The mass of the numerically significant small and very small agricultural businesses, but also the non-agricultural ones which, like the tourist sector, have an interest in public goods provided by agriculture, are scarcely integrated in these networks.
What can be assumed from that is, firstly, that it was not the socially central role of the managerial class in the firms alone, but also the embeddedness in professional networks that also encompassed the agricultural administration and professional associations. This allowed the former cadres to control central information in the firm, but also to have access to rapidly changing external information during the transition phase.
As a consequence, ironically the agricultural policy designed to support family farms stabilised the agricultural sector, dominated by large farms that now turns out to be rather disconnected from the rest of the rural economy . Generally, exclusive elements are the bureaucratisation and professionalisation of planning procedures that, on the one hand, form a barrier for 'real' participation. They encourage the development and maintenance of networks of professionals and development experts, which are only loosely coupled to the majority of local actors. However, while in the local context the farm managers remain in a stable position, inter-farm linkages and forward and backward linkages have suffered from the fundamental restructuring since 1990. Many production chains simply no longer exist and new chains and networks have had to be established.
Non-agricultural Inter-firm Networks
The agricultural experience is rather unique. For almost all other industries of the former GDR the restructuring process took a different path. One reason for this was that a small and medium size business sector did not exist. Even classical small business industries such as the construction and service sector had been organised in large cooperatives or state firms on a much larger scale than agricultural firms. Being dependent on the specifics of each sector those firms either grew, dissolved into smaller units, were taken over or even replaced by competitors from West Germany and international competitors (e.g. Kokalj et al. 1997 , Brussig 2003 .
Classical rural industries such as tourism, construction and other handicrafts saw a strong growth in the number of small and micro-businesses. Meanwhile, the food industry experienced a strong consolidation and was mainly taken over by external investors. For the modernization of the food sector, financial subsidies were given according to master plans written by West German economists, who paid little attention to business relations, but primarily technical relations and quantities. Needless to say that those plans failed dramatically (Laschewski 1998) . At the same time, due to the monetary union and the introduction of the strong German D-Mark special market linkages to Eastern Europe were suddenly lost. In sum, some economists identified 'torn networks' as a basic problem of East German recovery.
Rebuilding network relations therefore has become a major concern of newly founded, but also re-organised business (Nuissl et al. 2002) .
The fundamental restructuring of the economy has had a great impact on the employees. It has not only been rising unemployment, but also increasing job insecurity. Losing a job has suddenly become an everyday experience. The public sector was probably the only sector that was largely excluded from that. Family networks became the last refuge for many, and also the basis for start-ups. However, social exclusion has also become an extensive rural phenomenon. 'Rural ghettos' of long-term unemployed, socially marginalised groups dependent on social welfare evolved as a new reality (Willisch 2008 ).
Lessons to be Learnt
The brief description provided here, shows that in times of institutional change and economic transition social capital cannot easily be seen as a resource. In the case of rural East Germany it was difficult for many actors to draw on network relations, simply because those networks vanished after having lost their meaning, its institutional and physical basis. However, as the example of local commodity exchange networks shows, occasionally the network existence is an expression of institutional deficits. In such cases the dismantling of networks does not necessarily imply a 'loss' for society. One lesson to be learnt from this is that networks cannot be separated from their social meaning or content. The network content may be an economic, social or cultural function. The network relations and therewith the social capital related to the network do not exist without a particular content. And only if this social meaning is reproduced, so are the social network relations. Because of the concentration of so many economic and social functions in the agricultural firms under socialism agricultural restructuring has had such devastating effects on rural society after unification. One additional aspect may have been the absence of strong alternative, non-state institutional structures outside the former socialist state that could, at least temporarily, have served as a backup. For instance, East Germany, unlike other post-socialist countries such as Poland, is nowadays largely an atheistic country where churches do not play a significant role. Therefore, rebuilding social capital has to become a core concern for rural development policies.
The fact that the former cadres successfully exploited their positional power has two sides. It highlights, on the one hand, the centrality of those actors in the former rural regime. However, it also has to be seen as the outcome of institutional structures and in particular agricultural policies, which were transferred from the West, and simply did not fit into East German reality. The kind of problems, which have been addressed to this extent are unknown in Western Europe and therefore institutional structures to cope with such problems do not exist. Further, because of that, the institutional structures as mentioned earlier at least partially seem to increase the negative trends. Therefore, the change of the rural policy process is important to avoid further negative effects on the civic commitment of groups less favoured during transition.
A generalization from the East German experience could be that besides the identification and measuring of social capital, it is important to identify its base and thereby its likely durability in times of change. If an economic, social or cultural function is lost, it is likely that social capital related to this function will also be destroyed. Undoubtedly, this raises new questions, since social capital has been identified as crucial, in particular in times of change. However, this also gives room for careful optimism, due to the fact that new economic, social or cultural activities may serve as the basis for new social capital. Finally, in times of economic transition it is important to consider other spheres of society, even for economic reasons. Social capital encompasses a quite paradoxical element of the usefulness of the useless (Laschewski and Siebert 2001, p. 40) . As has already been mentioned, this brings another aspect to the fore, which also shows the limitations of the network theory: the problem of social meaning and culture (see also Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994) .
As long as local actors are perceived as 'incapable' and rural areas as 'underdeveloped' they become subjects for political intervention. The development of horizontal social capital will only be successful in connection with different understanding of rural development, which recognises the dimension of democratisation, civic commitment and local participation as development objectives and not only as another additional development factor to increase economic growth (Laschewski et al. 2008) .
Such a perspective would also allow addressing the problem of social exclusion. Rural research mostly focuses on the economic development and rarely on social integration. As some network theories argue, it depends on the nature of the social problem which form of social capital is more important. While social capital based on strong ties is more important for social integration, weak ties are mostly related to performance.
